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F O R E W O R D  
BY PROFESSOR BENJAMIN FARRINGTON 
This series of booklets was begun in 1943, the sixtieth anniver- 
sary of the death of Mant, as a tribute to his memory by British ' 
Marxists. The aim of the series is not so much to exmund 
the classics of ~ a r x i s m  as to offer a Marxist comment&v on 
J 
contemporary problems. Marxism has a contribution to make 
to world reconstruction. The world cannot be rebuilt except 
on the basis of democracy. Democracy does not mean only 
, freedom from want, from disease, from fear; it means also the 
widest possible extension of intellectual freedom. Democracy 
,mquir& that every man has not only the right and duty t-o 
,. labor for the common'good but also the right and duty to 
think for the common good. For the achievement of this 
end Marxism is a mighty engine. Where else in the world 
s h d  we find such faith in science, such faith in knowledge, 
such faith in reason, and so earnest an endeavor to expand 
their sway? These essays, .written by ~arxists ,  are a contribu- 
t i o ~  to the creation of confidence among men in their ability 
' to control their own destiny. The writers are fortunate in 
that they employ a tongue which has a long and honorable 
tradition of expressing the most difficult-subjects without jargon 
or pedantry. They have tried to be worthy of this tradition. 
- It is their further good fortune that this tongue enables them 
also to communicate directly with their brothers in the United 




- I., Does I t  Matter What a Mah Believes? 
Philosophy has been supposed to be a purely academic pur- 
suit of no possible heres\. to the man of action, the speculative 
activity of curious minds with nothing better to do. A disiin- 
@shed scientist says, '-'Philosophy may be described as argu- 
ment about things of which we are ignorant." Its subject matter 
is supposed by many to be that which lies beyond everyday ex- 
perience and is therefore in iti very nature either unknowable 
or nonexistent. 
others regard philosophy as the pursuit of pure G t h  by pure 
mind, an activity of great, indeed, of the highest importance, 
' 
but on a different and loftier plane than everyday life,.which is 
concerned with mGerial affairs. Thus Dr. Tudor Jones, dis-' 
cussing contemporary German philosophy in the year 1935, 
says: "In spite of the chaos that now exists in Germany in the 
political, social and religious life, -there are still men who have 
not bowed the knee to Baal, but6 have proceeded with their 
p&losophical thoughts ar if nothing had happened." (Our 
italics.) An activity so utterly remote from the problems and 
. demands of reaislife might well be considered to be fudle, and 
quite beyond the interest of ordinary folk. 
- But as a matter of fact the,man in the street has more philo- 
sophical notions in his head than he knows and they affect 
both his thinking and his actions. It has been well said that "we 
have no choice whether we shall form philosophieti for our- 
selves, only the choice whether we shall do, so consciously and. 
in accord with* some intelligible principle or ~copsciously 
and at random." The man who is contemptuous of philosophy 
' may be merely a man with ad unexamined philosophy, whose 
assumpti~ns are unc;itically held and many of whose judgments 
, are prejudices. "The unexamined life," said Socrates, "is not 
- worth living," and an unexamined philosophy may prove to 
be equglly unsatisfactory. 
- A moment's reflection revears the extent to which modern 
thinking is saturated with unexamined and usually false philo- 
- sophical notions. It is not difficult to t-e their origin back to 
traditional modes of thought which were the consciously held 
and taught philosophies of y'esterday or to the-writers; jour- 
1 
nali~t~~broadcasters, lecturers, preachers and teachers of our ' 
own day, some of them philosophers, 'oth-ers popularizers of 
other men's philosophies, while the rest reflect, in many cases 
more than they realize, the current philosophies of the time. 
Eventually discussion and conversation spread these ideas 
more widely still until the man in the railway train is heard ' 
declaring that science no longer believes in matter, the wife 
by the fireside argues that instinct is more to be,trusted than 
reason, and the Brains Trust, despite the protests of Prof,. J. D. 
Bernal, informs a credulous world that there is a lot to be'said 
for spooks. 
At first glance these common beliefs may seem to be quite 
unimportant, but their social significance is greater than ap- 
pears. As Bernal pointed out on the occasion mentioned above, 
it is significant that an immense increase in superstition charac- 
terized the decline of ancient Rome and now accompanies the 
disintegration of our own civilization. The ~ u l t  of unreason 
has been one of the diseases of the\ fascist mind in Germany 
and Italy and reflects a deliberate turning back to barbarism, 
the repudiation of the rational and scientific approach to the 
world, The renewed belief in mentalism, the theory that mind 
is the fundamental stuff of the universe and that matter is 
secondary or even unreal, is a view which crops up as the philo- 
sophical background of many reactionary attitudes .and. much 
social pessimism. 
Now all-these apparently trivial and certainly loosely hdd 
views really stem from philosophical positions .of far greater 
importance and complekity, from systems of philosophy, which - 
merit careful enquiry. Moreover they will mostly be found, 
on examination, to be forms of what is known as Ideal- 
ism, or to be closely allied to and dependent upon idealist 
views. It is therefore important that we should clearly under- 
+stand exactly what is meant by idealism. ~hiloso~hiCa11~ it is
not used in any of the popular senses either to describe an out- 
look on life which is blind to facts as they are, or a determina- 
tion to think the best of one's fellows, or a life ruled by Sdeals. 
The philosophical doctrine is a theory of reality in terms of 
, "ideas." The matter has been clearly put by Engels : "The great 
basic question of all philosophy, especially of modern philos- , 
ophy, is that concerning the reiation of thinking and being. . . . 
The answers which the philosophe~s gave to this question split 
them into two great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of 
spirit to nature,. . . comprised the camp of idealism. The others 
who regarded nature as primary, belong to the various schdols 
of materialism." 
A modern philosopher defines it a s the . view that "mind alone 
is real and material bodies are in some sense to be regarded as 
states of, or elements in, consciousness." 
- 
I 
. The fundamental principle is that matter is not the final 
reality, so that the actual world of nature tends to appear trivial 
and GimPOrtant, or at any rate derivative and -secondary. 
Many idealists bebeve that "Reality" lie$ beyond the material 
worfd,'as a rational and perfect system to be contrasted with 
the irrationality and imperfection of the world as experienced. 
Idealists also believe that mind or spirit is the creative force in 
the world. Not only did Spirit precede and create the material 
/world, but in life and history men lay hold of ideas, which are 
right and true in themselves, and proceed to apply them- to the 
world, making or re-making the world according to these 
principles. s l 
We shall shortly see what forms this philosophy takes in our 
time and what significance it has for a world passing through 
olie of its great periods of transformation. 
Marxism is itself a philosophy and its criticism of idealism 
is of course philosophical. It does not adopt the merely philis- 
tine point of view which brushes philosophy aside as "argument 
\ 
aboit things of which we are ignorant," or futile speculation, 
nor does it adopt a position of naive realism or common sense, 
the attitude of Dr. Johnson who when asked how he proposed 
to refute idealism said, striking his foot against a great stone, 
, "I refute it thus." Both Marx and Engels were trained philos- 
ophers whose own position was a development rather than a 
wholesale repudiation of curfent philosophy, Engels said, "Those 
who abuse philosophy most are slaves to- precisely the worst 
i 
vulgrized relics of the worst philosophers." Elsewhere he spoke 
of the importance of "learning to assimilate the results of the 
developmint of philosophy &ring the past two and a hal£ 
thousand years." Plekhanov, the Russian Marxist and the 
. / 
- ! I  
- ..ry.& 
teacher of. ltnin, was an &ble the study. d. -: '.? 
philosophical works Lenin. regarded as indispensable. 
'own mind was naturally and his 
reading was-systematic and unusually dcient. If his one gr-t' , 
philosophical wo& M a t d m  and Empirio-Cir'dcism is not, . 
always appreciated it is because most of those who uy to read . 
it are totally mawarc of the irrationalist philosophi& which ' 
it criticizes, 
M a r e m  is a claissical development of European philosophy, ; 
a revoIudonized Hegelianism. It is far 'from treating idealism .'.? 
.wi&contempt. Idealism has its origin in a more critical ac- .. 
count of human knowledgi. It shows, rightly, the extreme" :, : 
difliculty of knowing exactly what the objects of experience .'; 
- really are. Now this criticism of our knowledge of the ejrtenigl, ' . . 
warld is not nonsense; it is the first step 'from :vulgar, philis-. ?.' 
+tinism to a more rational and scientific understanding of -man, ' l ; . ,  
and his relation to nature. The understanding of 
all .our knowledge is and of the important 
whether we can know anything at all without 
rqatter. of importance. Idealism is a reaction 
belief in an abrupt presentation of physical things to the mindc .:' 
, as if they could be known for what they are as simply as a 
phdtographic plate records a picture. It errs when, going.bevorid . > , ,  
this, it denies the independent eltistence ,of th 
ception or asserts that we inore really know 
or m d  states &an any objects beyond them. 
' 
' We cannot do without the contribution which idealism has . : 
made to our understanding of the world bu 
.neither can we do CKith idealism as a 
I;enin says that it is,only its me-sidedn 
alism. "Philosophical idealism is nonse 
point, of a crude, simple and metaphysic 
contrary from the standpoint of 
sophical idealism is 'a one-sided, 
ment of one of the characteristic as 
edge." This aspect of knowledge is 
the knbwer and to the conditions of knowing. . , 
Whilp accepting this "characteris&c aspect or limit of howl-. -; 
\ -  - edge"- which idealism has established, . . Marxism, and of .tome- . .-i 
, r .-q! 
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, not: only Marxism but many$ &er phiioso~ s;. re$cts the 
exaggeration of relativity into a doubt'as to the ,&stqnce of an 
'idcfepdent .world, which is characteristic df much idealism, 
, : . v and asserts instiad what we may call the axiom ofiadependent 
keality. As Prichard states it, "Knowledge unconditionally pre- 
supposes that the reality known exists independently mf the 
knowledge of it, and that we know it as it exists in this 
independence." 
Marxism, therefore, does not Aatly refute idealism as though 
the 'whole id&t movement from Descartes to Hegel had - 
, been a preposterous error. --It does not brush Plato and his 
. di~iplcs on one side. So far from engaging in a head-on Icd- 
' lipion in, the Johnsonian style, .as is the manner of the crude 
' ,-$gaterialist, it absorbs ' even while it criticizes, it includes e v b  
. while it tmmcends'the idealist philosophy. In other words i t s  
whole attitude is dialectical. I 
11. Idealism and Its Ref tctation . , 
I / .  ' 
. . . . '~efbre dealing with certain recent developments of idealist 
, 1 
- .;philosophy which are taking a very definite place in the modern 
, $ I  , mind, it is nec~sary to clear up thee whole muddle about the 
' .theory that each mind perceives nothing but its own men61 
*.~'-s&tes. once' we -have done so, and not before, the errors'of 
. , our contemporaries can be successfully disposed of. 
i When a hard, square, red object, suih as a brick, is per- 
. .* . . ceived, we are perceiying a collection of qualities, and' we , 
. usually believe that thk object, the brick in this case, is that 
, - 
- *  which bar these qualities. But all such qualities are only known 
' to-us as .mental experiences of .color and the like. The red 
i - , patch is &ally, for bur minds,! a sense  experience,^ not a brick. 
If. we smell acrose we really smell ah odor, and that too -is a - 
s& experience. Even the hardness and shape are tactile ex- 
"imces. 1 7  , Let us call what we actually experience sensedata. 
. , I -  It is de;lr that what we normally do is to interpret the sense- 
!$ .-, = data as qualities of concrete objects and we say that we percdt,~ 
I , 'the brick by sensing its qualities. The quality,' we believe, 
r q ~ r e s  a substance in which to inhere. 
, 




the idealist. rhe thing is dotnmg more man the sum or its 
qxpm*mcid qualities. There can be no pssible proof of any- 
thing else. But since all qualities reside only in percipient 
minds, the object itself must do 'the same. In brief, the object 
is of the nature of an idea. % 
If that is so the idea of a brick is not different from the idea 
of beauty, or squareness or God. They are all mentally real, 
but not real in any other way.'Nor is a brick more real than 
- squareness, or squareness less real than-a brick. 
But the plain man at once points out ;1 significant difference?, 
Not all ideas have the same status. Some are vividly and per- 
sistently held in our minds, as if these qualities inhered in some 
' object before us, others are less objective, they are merely our 
ideas. The idealist grants this at once; He does not deny the , 
existence of objects which insist on being k n o m  and which 
are persistently there. All that he is out to deny is that an 
experience of this kind requires a mdhaZ universe. The ex- 
perience~ he argues, is not necessarily an experience of knowing 
a mutenal world. It is only a peculiar kind of experience. It 
is still something mental. The real problem is what can be the 
origin of such an experience, if not a material object? But 
since, even if matter existed, it is rather hard to imagine how 
it would get across to something so different from itself as 
mind, why should not something m m t d  be the cause of our 
experiences of collections of qualities? 
Idealists differ considerably as to what mental or "ideal" origin ' -1 . C there might be for our perceptions. Bishop Berkeley, one of ,, 
the ablest and the first of the modern idealists. held that the 'R t 
I 1) 
objects we perceive, not being of our own making, have their j . ?r cause, but that cause is not matter, but God. The only realities, - 
then, are God, other spirits created by Him, and the various : 
ideas or experiences which He has ordained to be apprehended 
in certain regular sequences. Idealism, :however, need not, be- .[ 
Eeve in God, and may instead simply rest in the ideal or , 
', . mental character of all reality. 
It will be seen that the upshot of the discussion is to disprove 
, the existence of a material world and to suggest -&at the whole 
experienced universe is of the same nature as the mind. If 
3 
that is the -case, materialism is refuted and the principal objec- 
tion to a religibus explanation of the universe is removed. And 
that is precisely what the founder of modern idealism, Bishop 
*Berkeley, intended. And very often it is precisely what our 
modern idealists haie in mind as well.' 
Now what is b e  reply? To strike a great stone with the 
foot and say "I refute it thus" is only to show that the theory 
has never even been understood. 
.We must do better than that. The refutation is-simpler than 
might be supposed. When the idealist says that it is only our 
bwn mental states that we know, or that we certainly know 
them better than we know anything else, he is laboring under 
* a misconception. Of course to know a-thing is to have an idea 
of it but that does not mean that you only know the idea. Be- 
cause you cannot be conscious of the material world without 
thinking about it, it does not follow that all you are conscious 
of is your thinking! The fact that a known thing must, as an 
element of knowledge, be classed as an idea only means that 
when a thing is known it occupies a new relationship-the 
relationship of being known. But in thus assuming the status 
of an idea, as well as a material object, it does not by any means 
become identified with it. The object does not become an idea 
and nothing but an idea. Therefore whatever is known is not 
just because it is thought about, itself of the nature of mind. 
The idealist has not yet proved his case, and it is up to him to 
, prove that material objects 'do not exist. The burden of proof 
is not on the believer in material reality to' prove that they do. 
Let us put the matter -a little differently. The idealist con- 
fuses the thing apprehended with the act of apprehension. A 
thought of a thing must be in the mind, but the thing of 
which we are aware is not in the mind, and is therefore not 
- mental. We thus vindicate a common sense attitude to reality. 
So far from mental experience shutting us up to pure sub- 
jectivism mind is essentially that which possesses the character- 
istic of becoming acquainted 'with things other than itself. - 
The idealists treat knowing ih a way which flatly traverses our 
experience. As Whitehead says, "This experience knows away 
from and beyond our 'own personality-it is not a knowledge 
about our own personality." Moreover it is not a passive per- 
ception of an un-get-at-able world, as if the observer were 
lacated in one ot those glass observatton chambers sunk 1n 
9. Knowledge is for' action and tesults in action, and ac 
means passing beyond thc self into the world. That is 
Lenin said that "to ask outside the realm 
the objective truth corresponds to human 
cism."* It is the success of our actions, argues Engels, that proves 
the correspondence of our perception with the objective nature 
of the objects perceived. "Practice ought to be the first and 
fundamental criterion of the theory of kn 
Thue are purely mental experiences but they are 
own .to be such by not standing up to the test of action. We 
rightly, call them7llusions. If, on the other hand, an 
ence allows us to act upon it, chects what was pure1 
(i.e. illusory) by some sharp reaction or verifies 
y began to produce them 
'thing-in-itself became a ' 
tinual interaction betwe 
f his knowledge. What 
sfully. ' If his knowledge 
irect, his action is unsucc 
strous. Moreover, succes 
ation and brings new facts 
have to observe carefully and learn to kno 
ge immediately requires a new kind 
tion and so the process goes on. 
Thus experience bears out the fact tha 
* . -  i 
1 
.L 
" 1  
. !  , \  ' - * ' . . 
->,.' , 
> - - ? 
being locked up in the world of our -own ideas., On &e m; 
vary we .are always finding out things, about the world, out-' 
- side us and adjustiag ourselves by action to its requirements. 
Objectivity is of the essence of the experience. 
\ 
; "It must, hbwevu, be carefully nqed just zuha is refuted. ' 
. It is subjectivism, mentalism, that is the mistake. 
But the recognition that our knowledge of things at any 
, - one time is not final and absolute, but relative, is not a mistake 
This,.is a fact of the greatest importance, a fact unknown to 
the older materialists, and ignored by the uncritical. -What 
, idealism bequeath= to us as a permanent heritage, is what 
, . Unin c& the dialectical elmtent in e now ledge, the recogni- 
- tion of the relqtivity of all knowledge, of the fact that it is 
1' strictly conditioned, that what we know of it d e w &  on, a 
multitude of particular circumstances. This is the truth be , 
hind the fact that we perceive only through sense-data. We 
- perceive objccti, but the qualities of obj&ts are conditioned in 
all manner of ways. Qualities do not merely hhqe  in sub- 
stances but are given in the relationship of the observer to the 
object. That possibility is only realized under conditions, and 
, 'not only the object but what the conditions are determine what . 
. the qualities are. 
yet once again we must. bektre of one-sidedness, of falling 
'/over backwards into a complete denial df ob jdve  truth and 
the wastion that all we know are fictions or symbols mated 
by our orvn minds. However relative our knowledge to the 
L / 
conditions under which we know, whatever properties and . 
' , laws we discover are really there and a& as accurately recorded 
. , aS the circumstances allow. The iesults are true w far as they 
I -go, This is less than ,naive realism claims when it asserts that 
.': :& know objects as they really. and completely are lh th- . 
i; s e k ,  but very much more than is allawed by sceptical ideal- 
- . /  ism ,which declares that we cannot be sure of anything at & ' 
:*, 
outside of our own mental states. In other words eich rb rded  
. ''.ob~?ation and discovery is a step forward to absolute objec- 
tive knowledge.. The step of our advancing science are par- 
I . f  
.' tid-and limited, but they advance into fuller and fuller truth. 
, '  . Now .we have hitherto been discussing only our knowledge 
" aad'its *onditions. But it 'is already obvious that we cannot - .I , 
- %i > . ,  
b' , / 
1 
' A  , 
!, a 
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separate (though we can distinguish) knowledge and its ob- 
ject. When we say that under certain conditions of tempera- 
ture and light a certain substance is a colorless fluid, we are 
stating the-limits of our knowledge at that moment and at 
the same time describing the object, not absolutely, but rela- 
tively. If we lower the temperature the same substanEe may 
become hard and opaque. This extends the limits of our - - 
knowledge and adds new properties, under new conditions, to 
, the object. This is a very simple example but both modern 
science and modern philosophy are at one with Marxism in 
stressing *the great truriabillity and the infinite potentiality of 
things, which are not neat bundles of fixed qualities, but ever- 
changing complexes G t h  explosive and a great 
range of properties, only few of which we at present know. 
'So that we no longer say: This is a hard, square, red object, 
but: This is an object which to me, in this particular light, at 
this particular temperature, from here is a square, red object, 
and, in relation to what I am scratching it with, it is hard. 
That, of course, is simple enough. But it is not quite so sim- 
ple when you begin to organize things into different patterns 
or combinations. Suddenly entirely new and unpredictable 
properties emerge. Chemical compounds have quite different 
properties from the elements which combine to form them. 
Hydrogen is a gas, oxygen is a gas, but their combination in 
.certain proportions is water. Organic substances have quite 
different properties from inorganic and yet may be synthesized 
from the inorganic. Protoplasm performs a synthesis which 
we cannot as yet perform in the laboratory; it builds organic 
substances first into proteins and then into protoplasm which 
then exhibits the characteristics of life-it respires, it reproduces 
itself, it moves, it excretes, it responds to s6mul&. 
A 
I 
Life is simply the of a particular pattern or com- 
bination of previously non-living parts, but its reality -and 
novelty are undeniable. 
The relativity principle thus becomes the ,principle of emer- 
gence, the principle of the infinite potentiality of matter. It 
completely shatters the older materialist view that matter was 
a limited and almost altogeth,er known affair which was cer- 





of the transition frbm non-living to living. Now in so far as 
idealism insistss that we do not know anything completely but - 
only under 'the peculiar1f.- limited conditions of each particulai , 
experience of knowing, it helps us, without mentalism or 
magic, to loosen up-the rigidities of an earlier materialism. 
But once ah in  note that this is a statement about our knowl- 
edge and not only about matter. "So far ar I @zow," we must 
always say, "such and such is the case, or such and such are 
the properties of this thing." Every statement of knowledge 
m-t be thus qualified. We can no longer say that we know 
, anything unconditionally. Knowledge, we see, is not a "read- 
ing off' of the specification of an object, but a statement of the 
result of a particular relationship between the knower and the 
known at a particular moment and under the unique condi- . 
. tions oft that moment. Knowing is a two-way business in 
. which the way I approach 'what I know, what I do in order 
to h d  out what it is, the conditions of my knowing, are quite 
as important as what the object is in itself. 
III. The Refitation of Mechanistic Materialinn 
- A position almost identical with that of idealism has been 
reached by certain physiological materialists. Bertrand Russell, 
far instance, who is thoroughly idealist in his philosophy, 
nevertheless employs crude materialist arguments. These 
philosophies point out that our only evidence for the existence 
of an eternal wqrld is .given by certain sensations which are 
themselves the result of nervous currents activating certain 
cells in the brain. These nerve currents are set up by purely 
physical stimuli, of heat, wave motion, pressure, applied to 
certain nerve, endings in the skinj-eye, ear and so forth. Now 
we have no reason at all to assume that the mental end-eflect 
produced by a brain cell at the end of a long chain of physical 
or physiological events is in any way like the original stimulus; 
any more than the explosion of a cartridge is like the finger 
which pressed the trigger. The physiology of the human body 
- and the brain, it is argued, shuts us up to mental md-eflects. 
"Everything that we'can directly observe of the physical world," 
says krtrand Russell, "happens inside our heads and consists 
\ 
1. 
' of mental eirenk. The development i f  this point of view 
- lead us to the conclusion that the distinction between mind 
and ,maiter is illusory." Thus a purely materialistic view ends 
as something indistinguishable from idealism+tn inter- . 
esting example, by the way, of the Marxist law of a thing 
passing over into its opposite.+ But by a curious inconsistency, 
as Whitehead has pointed out, these same people who express 
themselves. as though bodies, brains and nerves were the-~nly 
real things in an entirdy imaginary world base all their evi- 
- dence on the experimenters' perception of another person's 
body. But our evidence for the bodies we experiment upon 
. . and diss'kct in order to build up our science of physiology is 
of exactly the same type as, but weaker than, our evidence for 
the external world we are asked to deny. These materialists 
are treating bodies on materialist principles in order to treat 
ail the rest of the wosld*\on idealist principles and it won't do; 
An excellent example, we may remark, of what Bosanquet 
called "the meeting of extremes in contemporary philosophy." 
- We have already indicated the reply. If we are quite sure 
that these end-effects are obtained by a physical stimulus fall- 
ing on a specific nerve-ending or sense oigan which can be 
f d l y  described, as of course can the physical stimulus and its 
organ, if we are quite sure about the optic and sensory 
nerves ' which we have dissected put and experimented with, 
add of the brain with its nerve cells, localized functiops, visual 
ande auditory areas, etc., d l  the result of endless 'experihents, 
we are surely pretty certain about the existence of at any. rate 
that quch of the external world, and if we find no reason 
doubtthat,whydoubttherest? I 
But the argument is, from the o 
. Bishop Berkeley all over again. It is 
mcnt for mentalism but a philosophical 
we have .already replied. 
*.& Lenin said, dialectic is '  the "teaching of 
are identical . . . how they tutn into each other, 
turning into the other." Engels, too, has spoken 
in* one another's direction." This position, h 
mth the, more limited and abstract notion that opposites 




To the biologist no such doubts as to the existence o 
ternal world are likely to occur because, unless he is a very 
ad biologist, he is concerned all the time not with a dead 
specimen on a dissecting board, in fwhos~ anatomy tie is inter- 
ested, but with a 'living organism functioning in an external 
environment, adapted to that environment and constantly re- 
acting to it. The biologist works on two major assumptions, 
firstly that the animal is aware of its environment and has a 
most elaborate apparatus of sense organs ' and responsive / 
mechanisms to keep it aware and to make swift reaction pos- 
sible; secondly, he assqes that his organisms do function id 
relation to a real world and do know a great deal of it, enough 
of it to react satisfactorily, and survive. In fact if an animal 
erminate its existence. 
The biologist also believes that while even his most primitiv 
organisms possess- this awareness and power of response, the 
most complex, including mammals and man, have developed 
awareness and response to an altogether amazing degree. 
Moreover, he* knows that in the case 'of man, we have not only 
a very subtle and skilful control of behavior in relation to en- 
No biologist, except when he is thinking philosophically and 
inking a wrong philosophy, is either a mentalist denying 
the external world or a mechanistic materialist. For him an 
animal exists in relation to a real environment and reacts with 
through awareness and the power to know it. 
The significance of the biological approach is immense. 
at one and-the same time a refutation of idealism and a 
refutation of that form of materialism which excludes mind 
from the universe. Constrained by its own subject matter, i 
own experience and experiment, the science of biology blds to 
gether what man has too often put asunder, mind and matter. 
The materialist who, believing only in the physiological 
mechanism leading to brain events, so surprisingly ends up as 
an idealist does not, of course, anticidate that this will Drove 
A 
He sets out to prove 
is nothing properly 
which is limited to predictable 
For him, if consciousness 
cast by the brain or in 
' some other way consistent with &e complete dependence.-of . 
.mind on matter. Consciousness, in t-mes a product 
without -consequences, as a chalk mark left bv drawing with a 
piece of chalk on a board is ah effect left by ;he Dassage of the' - 
Chalk but has, as a mark, no effect itself 06 the khalkYnor the - 
, hand which moves the chalk. This for most materialists is 
the .conclusion of the argiment and it is the classical positio- 
of what is often called mechanistic materialism but more gen- 
erally 'known simply as the materialist philosophy. 
Marxism has always strenuously opposed this form of ma- 
terialism on the ground that it is in flat contradiction of the 
evidence to reduce life and consciousness .-- a*4 -Hp.)ou. to chemis 
ism does not deny w o = i X e r  life or min aW. t asserts, Ma x-
however, -that they are functions of highly organized matter 
on the organic level. "Every level of organization," says Need- 
ham, f'has its own regularities and pri~ciples, not reducible .to 
those appropriate to lower levels of organization, nor applicable 
to higher levels, but at the same time in no way inscrutable or 
immune from scientific analysis or comprehension." 'There- 
fore the levels of life a id  A n d  are noi reducible to ~hvsics 
and chemistry but are unique, with their own specid ihar- 
, acteristics, modes of behavior and laws. 
I * *  But the Marxist does not attribute these 's~en'al charactenistics 
! I to $he inftdsion of a vital principle into mdtter from the realm I of mind or spirit. He claims that in the realm of nature are to 
be found &f$erent organizational levels in an ascen- series. 
"From ultimate physical particle to atom, from atom to mole- 
aggregate, from aggregate to 
organ to %from animal 
of organizational levels is 
complete." Just as life in its simplest form is characteristic of 
the -mlloidal aggregation of proteins' known as protoplasm, 
and has the alt&'&ther new power in nature of synthesizing 
new protoplasm from oFganic acids, so protoplasm organized 
iii a living cell follows this power of organic growth with the 
new Dowers of re~roduction, of self-repair, of response to 
stimdus. At a hig6er level still, specializeh cells concern them- 
selves wholly wi& registering impressions from the environ- 
ment and bringing about the -activation of muscles which ' 
secures an appropriate response. These nerves are called: re- 
ceptors and iffectors.   in all^ a complex organization of nerve 
cells is interposed between receptors and effectors, first .to pro- 
vide a multitude of alternative associations, like a telephone 
exchange, but ultimately 'to think about the situation revealed 
by the receptors, in order that the effect or discharge may 
bring about considered, problem-solving action. 'In other 
words, when matter is organized in nerves it feels and acts, 
when matter is organized in a brain it thinks. Thought, mind, 
is not a substance added to the matter, it is a function of a cer- 
tain kind of matter. This is a conclusion as perfectly in har- 
mony with biological science as mechanistic materialism is in 
' contradiction to it. It is, of course, a view held not only by 
Marxists but by mdt, if not all, professional biologists and by 
an increasing number of philosophers with a real knowledge 
of biology. y . 4 
- The mechanistic materialist has formulated his position in 
an honest endeavor to be -true to scientific pinciples, to seek 
out scientific causes, not to multiply entitiei and fall back in 
every case of difficulty upon the supernatural. He is above all 
things in violent reaction from vitalism, which injects a living 
force into matter to 'explain life. He is fundamentally opposed 
to the theory -of the interaction of two completely disparate 
entities-mind and body. 
All this is wrfectlv correct and even in this narrow and 
somewhat rigid form; materialism has broadened the field of 
science, firmly established the scientific method and done much 
to over&row obscurantism and superstition. 
But the mechanist in banishing mind from the universe be- 
&uSse he iannot accept the interaction of mind and matter, 
* A I I 
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rV. 3 fie Delusion of Dualism 
I 
The reason is a simple one. Both mechanistic materialism 
and idealism derive from an unnatural splitting of the uni- 
.verse into disparate realities, mind and matter. This took 
plaq in cermin historical conditions plhich we cannot go into, 
under the influence of the French philosopher Descartes 
(1637). Descartes set science on its feet by showing that (from 
one point of view) the universe is extended substance (occupy- 
ing space) and exhaustively comprehended. in the terms of 
mathematics. "Give me extension and motion," he said, "and fl 
I will construct the universe." But how, in that case, account 
for mind? Descartes held that mind also exists, but it cannot 
interact with matter since it does' not occupy space. Thus arose 
,that strange philosophical bifurcation of the universe which 
has not been overcome down to our own day. It had two 
opposite consequences. On the one hand science went ahead 
and by the immense success df its purely mathematical ap- 
proach, and just because it ruled out the supernatural, achieved 
h considerable victories. Its followers dropped the idealism of 
Descartes. They could ,do without the realm of pure spirit. 
. It was entirely superfluous. On the other hand, those who, 
based their thinking on Descartes' proofs of the existence of 
--pure spirit, soon found they had no need for matter. They be+ 
came pure idealists. 
Thus there came into existence two opposing philosophies, 
materialism and idealism, each. of which really implied the 
other. They were the two halves of an indissoluble whole. 
The materialist has stripped the universe of mind, but he has 
'not got rid of it. He cannot. It is, if not the skeleton, at any 
/rate the ghost in his cupboard, and it'is always plaguing him. 
If the physical universe is without mind, then mind must exist 
as a thing in itself, and to that conclusion men will continue 
to come as certainly as water will come in through the holes 
of a sieve. They are wrong, of course, but they are forced to 
be wrong in order somehow to- justify the indisputable evi- 
dence for the mental and spititual elementsin human life. 
In their efforts to win back the mind which is separa't* from 
11 be compelled to follow one of two courses. 
23 
- The &st solution .is to go back to dualism and stand t jme 
utterly inbmpatible entities4side by -side, invoking magic or 
, the supernatural, to explain their interaction (this was the , 
position of the psycholo~st .William ~ c ~ o u ~ a l l '  nd is today 
' 
the position of Joad). The alternativt solution, natural to those I 
convinced of the independent reality of mind, is to deny 'the 
'Q existence of matter; except as a construct or projection or crea- . 
. tion of mind, and we slide rapidly down into mentalism again. .-! 
+ The firm believer in the selfexistence of mind is also an 
invcrted materialist sidce he also believes that matter cannot 
think. Thus, in a recent Brains Trust, Joad disagreed with 
, the medical man who asserted that the mind ceases to assimi- 
late new ideas in old age because of hardening of the arteries. ,$.I 
"Surely," said Joad, "we must distinguish between .the m i ~ d  4 
and the brain. What assimilates new &acts is not the brain but L ~ J  
the mind. A piece of matter cannot kno'w anything, -cannot -[: 
contain a fact, it can only move about. What .happens to ;the 
brain cannot possibly affect the mind." To which the doctor 
replied that i t  was evidenti that Joad did not know .very much 
about physiology. 
Let us note one other consequence. There $is a sham fight 
on. A battle between Tweedledum and Tweedtedee. It is 
this head-on collision between the mechanistic materialists and 
the .idealists. I r i s  a useless and confusing procedure. They 
are both right and they are both wrong. c he presuppositions 
of b& are wrong. It is a mistake to prove to the materialist 
*that mind exists as something over against matter. But it is 
eqkally a inistake to prove that matter is mindless. The 
mechanistic materialist has got to see that matter (in brains) 
can think. The idealist has got to see that thinking, being real 
, enough, nevertheless never takes place except in brains. . 
Now this is 2 dialectical solution and Marxism is a dialecti- 
cal philosophy. Descartes splits the unity of thinking matter 
and createi the thesis and anti-thesis of the opposites, body and 
% mind. This is a historical necessity and a phase in the devel- 
opment of science and thought. But it is not a final phase; It , 
creatqs insoluble contradictions. They are resolved, not eclectti- 
caUjr by tying up mind and matter side by side, but dialecti- 
cally, by a return to the original unity on a higher kl.. "The, 
identity of opposites," says Lenin, ?more accurately perhaps , 
their unity,. is the recognition of the mutually exclusive and ' 
opposed tendencies in all the phenomena and processes of 
- nature."' "The existence of two mutually contradictory aspects, 
their, conflict and their flowering together into a new category," 
wrote - ~ a r x ,  "comprises the essence of the dialectical move- 
ment." 
In the new synthesis we embrace the manifold achievements 
- of mechanistic science and idealist philosophy (and they are * 
great). We enrich that unity and we resolve' the contradictions. - 
That is the Marxist as it is the biological and philosophical 
solution of the Body-Mind problem. 
- Marxism maintains the unity and interpenetration of oppo- 
'sites &ch we &d in the concrete world. Pure matter is an 
abstraction, and while it may be useful enough to abstract the 
physical or mathematical properties of matter for 'practical 
purposes, yet we must put what we have, on paper, orb in our 
heads, separated from the more complex whole, back into that 
whole when we have finished. 
Not only is this true of livingathings, it is 'also true of the 
physical universe which, to beA known and understood at all, 
has to be brought into close relations with living beings. As 
- we have seen earlier, what we know depends largely, on the 
r a g e  of our senses, on what we actually do with things, on ' '- 
h e  nature of our experiments, and on,the nature of our re- 
quirements. In this way, too, mind and matter interpenetrate 
and an organic unity exists in all knowledge, a unity of knower 
- and known. . , 
Out of the artificial dualism which we hqve criticized arise , 
not only mechanistic materialism and idealism, but a host of 
philosophical 'aberrations, some of them of considerable popu- 
larity. They constitute the current philosophy of our times in 
its idealist aspect and we not without social significance.' 
We' propose to consider some idealistic consequences of 
phil~&phical dualism current today, - and to indicate their re- 
sults in the social and.politica1 sphere. 

y; ;> .* '$,:i,;rc '. * -9q:There are three separate fallacies involved in the .iddstr,;:@ .k$-"'h - " I  
, position. , :I \::..( :: ?;:+ 
- -7 s a 4 5<&*: 
Firsdy, all that. is really meant by modern science is that the!:!,$.$$ 
: t -*+ 4 . 4  
'$: nineteenth-century view of matter, at the ~ltra-microMopiq~,,,~~ [@; . level, is out of -date. It no longei consists of hard, indivisible q.13 I - :  
bit: " '*I 
k b i h , <  I!: .-, '-4 billiard-bdl-like atoms but ,of electrical phenomena. ~ u t  a l n ' ' ; c  +:',: 
, neitlhn view has got anything at all to do with solidity on the. ,,,:
.ft 
- ' i d  -:# l e d  of ordinary experience. On that level, matter is as*solid$~~$ 
t -::$ as ever it was, it not only appeari to be solid, it is solid, it does q :r!q 
,*:,-; * " >;;it 
, .- I possess that solid reality which it appears to p6ssess." The - ;+..% , .$.-,* . ,$:5p - 
--:'Td scientist does not deny that however tenuous and irnpalp L, :;: 
. , 7 . ~  &\I ,I 2% able the ultimate constituents of matter may be; the result ;'::tji 
I P *d;p d, '- .:J,R~ % y l  in our man-size world is ordinary tables and chairs which j e  >ti., a +  
scientist believes in like everybody else. -.Q t e , j ~  ?q 
4 *? 91%: &. :. ' i"b; i;prqat Secondly, however. tenuous and non-solid ultra-microscopic ,;fcktGt 
Y@ katter is found to be, it does not cease to be matter. Matter has .?-$?:; -." 4f bgr# T 2 merely been further described. It has only ceased to be ma- / L&,?, 
mechanists, some philosophers "not only threw out the bath 
water, but the baby as well. By denying the immutability of 
the elements and properties of matter known hitherto, they 
ended with the denial of matter, the denial of the objective 
reality of the physical world." l6 
Thirdly, from the lack of solidity on the ultra-microscopic 
level, from the mathematical abstractions which help us to 
, understand matter at that level, and frorb the undeniable, fact 
of -the relativity of our knowledge (that which we know de- 
pends on how we handle it, on our limitations, our conditions 
of ,knowledge) they pass over into pure mentalism, as Joad 
does, matter becomes "a projection from the consciousness of 
tli'e perceiver." • 
But this does not follow. We have already* discussed- the' 
. dependence of knowledge on the point of view of the knower 
and s h o ~ n ~ t h a t  dependence does not rule out independence. 
The argument is of sufficient importance to be recalled. That 
the object exists independently of us is an unchangeable fact; 
what it is exactly we know, only in part, in aspects, with .but an 
approximate degree of truth. Thatwhat we thus know is true 
as far as it goes we ' know because we act successfully on that 
knowledge. So far from matter dissolving into mind, mind 
remains that which possesses the characteristic of becoming 
acquainted yith things other than itself, while matter remains 
that which is known. Relativity does not lessen objectivity. 
, All perception is a judgment of therenee. We do not infer 
an object because we have a perception; perception involves a 
judgment of external reality and needs no inference. We do 
n~t-~erceive- ideas, or abiitractions. We perceive something. 
We thus refute subjectivism not by reasserting a naive, un- 
critical realism, not by going blindly back to .mechanistic 
- materialism, but by taking up into our objectivism the sub- 
jective factors of knowledge. We come back to the objective, 
world again but with a new conception of our relation to it, 
which is-no longer that of a contemplative eye passively observ- 
ing it, or a "spot-light" falling upon it to enable us to "read off  
what is out there, but is that of an organic unity between 
knower and-known. "Duality in unity is implied. in all experi- 
ence," says James Ward, "but .not dualism." 
It is doubtful if such views would ever have become so 
widely held but for the fact that a breach in the walls of scien- 
tific knowledge may be expected to let in a host of phantoms 
from the supernatural realm which may be taken fm realities. 
If-reality is mind, then there may be mental or spiritual reali- 
ties outside the physical universe, outside of space and time, 
unknowable and unverifiable by the sense but accessible to 
spirit through spiritual organs of apprehension or intuition. 
This belief opens the floodgates to every form of superstition 
and mentalism. 
Instead of seeking out the scientific causes of disease the 
rnamwho believes in the supernatural may attribute it to black 
magic, or devils, or a punishment'from God. Instead of install- 
ing a water-borne sewage system, he resorts to prayer and 
a sa-crifice. Natives in Central Africa when they fail in their 
primitive methods of iron-smelting do not try to find out what 
technical error they have made, but attribute their failure to 
someone having bewitched them. Superstition is therefore not 
only a reflection of ignorance; it tends to perpetuate it. Even- 
tually science is held to be something blasphemous. It is 
irreligious to take out of the sphere of the spijitual or of Provi- 
- J - dence that which rightly belongs to it: Russian peasants under 
the Czar attributed famine not to sh?llov ploughing but to *:l 
-5 the Divine Wrath. They were taught to accept epid.emics as 
a discipline of the soul. In India today superstition still ob- 
structs social advance. Even in our owh country trade depres- 
sion, wars, disease and poverty are often felt to be divine dis- 
pensations, or due to irresistible and inscrutable forces which it 
is folly for us to seek to control and presumptuous to seek to 
, understand. 
If it should be contrary to the interests of any privileged sec- 
tion of the community to remove these evils, it will be seen 
how the superstition which paralyzes map's efforts serves their 
ends. In this fact we have, perhaps, one of the reasons for the 
revival of idealism in an ige in which many social evils exist 
and in which the remedies at hand conflict with vested 
interests. 
"Is it not odd," asks Stebbing, "that men should welcome, as 






phikmphers and scientists fromlMach a d  Avenarius tb Bug- ' - 
m and Vaihinger. 'Tb view is that science never gets be * 
yond its owq .perceptions and the more or less arbiv-&y ways 
in which they are built up by the mind into scientific con-. 
structs. These come, mistakenly, to -be regarded as external 
objects and scientific laws. "All b o u g h  the physical world," 
says Eddington, "runs as unknown content, which must raUy 
be the stuff of our own consciousness. We have found that 
where science has progressed the farthest, the mind has but 
" regain~d from nature that which the mind has put into 
nature." l7 Scientific laws and, in fact, thp whole scientific 
description of the world, thus %come to be a collection Of fic- 
tions or abstrations- which, to use an example of Eddington's, 
no more describe the reality they stand for than ,the numbers 
of telephone subscribers tell us anything about the subscribers 
themselves. The theory, in some quarters, is extended to over- 
throw the whole notion of causation and scientific law and. to 
substitute mere succession or ,observed regularities. Thus a 
-wire glows when you pass electricity through it, but we must 
not say that the electricity causes the rise in temperature, we 
havk merely two events which frequently pccur together 'so 
that thue is the probability of them doing so again. There can 
be no ItCcessm connection between the so-called cause and 
effect. As J O ~ C ~  rightly says of this whole *point of view, ."it 
strikes the authentic subjectivist note." 
It is a much older theory than most people suppose. The 
first exhaustive criticism of it, indeed, was Lenin's Matcroa2ism 
and Emp'rip.CriEicism, in which Mach, Avenarius, Karl Pear- 
son, Ostwald, Poincar4 (the scientist) and the NeeKantians 
come in for severe criticism. 
Once again the issue cannot be resolved by head-on collision. 
, The irrationalists and fictionalists have got something. 
They are in revolt from a much too rigid rationalisrp and 
from a naive "spot-light" view of scientific knowledge. Objects ' 
are not like a neat row of exhibits on a shelf which can be' 
accuratelv labelled. Laws are not a collection of fixed and h l  
legal twlis, which things, must obey, and which science * looks, 
. up and reads off in the great textbook of nature. "Cauie and , 
effect" in nature is not, the: same thing as the logical necessity ' 
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by which the conclusion of a syllogism is reached. The. effect is 
not in the cause as the conclusion is contained in the premises, 
That kind of a mechanical universe n&er existed. It is correct, 
,too, that all formulations are abstractions, freeze the flowing 
moment, selet an aspect from an infinity of possibilities. It is 
true that in all knowledge the knower is so tied up with what 
he knows that you cannot separate them. Knowledge, as we 
have said, is an organic Yelation and a relation of selectivity 
and activity, not a bare contemplative r8eflection. 
But because the* mechanical universe of naive science does 
not exist there is no need to abandon the objectivity of things 
and the reality of laws. That, as Lenin said, is to empty out 
the baby with the bath water. 
All sich doubts are based upon the erroneous notion that 
true knowledge is the perception of an external object which 
is precisely what it is apart from *our knowing it, "an intuitive 
apprehension of the real" 5nd necessarily always infallible; 
a i d  it is also based upon the view that we ought never to rest , 
cpnterit with anything less than a full, coercive and infallible 
knowledge. Once' this simple dogmatism is subjected to the 
thoroughgoing criticism of relativism, the tendency is to aban- . 
don it for sheer irrationalism. 
, But reality is not overthrown by its relational character but ' 
is so constituted. It is only the ghost of a strict rationalism 
which condemns us to despair. 
These criticisms" of scientific reality are due to the unavail- 
\ ing struggle to apprehqnd with logical certainty the structure - 
of a finished reality as it stands over against a passive observer. 
Once it is seen that reality can be truly if imperfectly known 
only -as a construct in which mind and nature are partners, 
then we shall see what while our claims to know may be 
modest, they may nevertheless be firm. 
Just as idealism refutes a naYve realism, so does irrational- 
ism, but it goes too far. The mind, does contribute a great 
deal to the scientific picture of reality, which is not merely 
"read off." Hypotheses, models, fictions, categories, all imgy 
mental activity, not a passive reflection of reality. But there is 
a way of making sure that the element of construction inherent 
itl our scientific thinking is valid, and not, as irrationalism be- 
lieves, mere fiction. We do not only observe and think, we -, 
experiment. "We can .test both our theories and the observa- 
tion on which they are based by our success or failure in act- 
ing upon them. I£ our imaginary constructigns cannot be used 
to anticipate correctly the results of our activities, they cannot 
be valid. Experiment is an essential part of our means of die 
tinguishing between constructions which are knowledge and 
constructions which are merely efforts of the imagination. 9,  18 
Such experiment moreover is "not an appeal from thought to 
perception but an appeal from reflection and imagination to 
action, from theoretical experience to practical experience. 99 19 
Irrationalism, however, is more than a philosophical error; 
it has $e most serious social consequences. 
- 
- 1. Truth becomes anything we can get believed, any pattern 
convenient to ourselves, into which we can force the facts. 
The Fascist attempt to coerce the facts is a good example of 
this. 
- 2. On the other hand, if the universe is irration~l, nohonest 
man can really have faith in any theory, since he knows it is 
really only the shape his own mind puts upon events. The 
economic and political theories of Socialism are not truths but 
fictions, myths. Conviction therefore comes to depend not on 
understanding reality but on faith. And that kind of faith 
is not what men die for. 
3. Finally, this view sees in the objective world only chaos 
and lawlessness, since order and law. are simply the -mental 
spectacles through which we choose to look. The 'conclusion 
for every honest mind is to throw away the spectacles and 
face the sheer brute irrationality of life, a creed of complete 
despair. In a declining civilization torn with insoluble con- 
' tradictions and distressed with hopeless paradoxes, chaos is of 
course a fact, and that is why irrational theories of the woAd 
and flights to realms of purely mental peace or supernatural 
pe&ection are so common. But both reactions avoid the plain 
task of understanding the world in its chaos, diagnosing its 
evils and reconstructing it. Such theories are therefore pop* 
with those who either cannot, or dare not, or will not, face 
that task. 

.- + .'equally m&Cekned with :the exorCisrp of d&ils a d  witb ' ' 
, gqjnns, or a sciedtist were not quiie.~sure lwhether magic or 
fl . ri;le.ehaniu should' establish the principles of a e r o P h  con- ' I  . 
, . :stmaion. , 
*.The Harvard philosopher Santayana has devoted his greai 
&fts to the cult of this form of idealism. His other-worldliness, 
' his ascetic raptwe over pure beauty and the ideal world spring- 
.from his discovery "in the heart-of metaphysGs of that pedec- 
. ': tion he vainly sought in nature and in reason. He has come - 
full circle to a Platonic insight that,looks upon all life as fleet- 
* ink and imperfect and somehow unsatisfactory. He is at last a , 
'free soul,' bound to this earth by only the slightest of ties, 
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. ,zind ever ready to turn his back on these. 
-This contemplative habit obviously finds more satisfaction,in 
, solitude than in society, in art than inbusiness, in prayer than a 
. in politics. It is stimulated by looking inwards, conternpla- 
@vely; ratha than by looking outwards to see what needs to , 
be done. The world has not to be altered'but only understood 
I -by mystical insight, b? seeing 'all things under the form of ' 
- eterniiy. $ 
' 
- Such theories invariably afhm the superiority of the spiritual ' 
-. over the material. The more abstract and u n r d  indeed, the . . - 
&use satred the reality. The consequence is to give @e utmost 
. imPOrta&e t o  the non-red and little or no importance to the ' 
nreal. 
The result is not on19 complete £utility, but in pursuing this 
c b  * .  GQ-&the wisp such people turn away from and condemn. 
. eyery sine, rational and ..scientific approach to the problems 
beforeathem as doomed to failure_because it neglects the spir- 
itual. Thus they drift into opposition to all scheqes and move- - 
ments for social reform. 
Fortunately most idealists are sufficiently inconsistent to at- 
.,tempt to .make the best oflboth worlds, an attempt not, how- . 
.- fever, -likely to succeed since 'their theories 'tend inevitably to 
' 
vitiate their saner and more rational impulses. What must be 
-- the influence, for example, of *MIS Gerald Heard on his dis- 
. ciples? 'He comes forward as' himself the prophet or mystic 
way to-the highe; life. Yet the loftier his' claims, 
. ~q.mpletelv empty of- content or reason do they. a p  
I 
4 
pear; the more woolly are his ideas, the more verbal his pre- 
cepts. "we is &e neo-Brahmin. He is, the pilot. He is the 
' 
antennae of the new society. He specializes in and communi; 
cates spiritual power. He is in touch with the Source. I only 
wish I could escape the impression that he is selling something 
the nature of which, unfortunately, cannot - be divulged." 22 1 
Once again the door is flung wide open to every form of self- . 
delusion and  garl la tan ism. Once the criterion of conformity 
to external material reality, of experiment and practice, is re- 
. moved, literally anything can be exalted into a spiritual thing- 
in-itself. The wise-and o o d  exalt into mystical-realities the& 
own wisdom and goodn&s, but the fool worships his folly and , , 
. the villain his villainy. In fact, as Chesterton pointed out, long 
, ago, "When Jones begins to worship the God within,' he usually 
ends up by worshipping Jones." ' 
There is anotherside to the cult of the non-material, and 
that. is the degradation of the physical. Beginning with . Plato 
the idealist tends, in separating consciousness, 'and with it 
' human values, from the body to abandon the body to non- 14 
human, that is to say, animal propensities. If the higher life - 4 
is in the realm of spirit, it can, only be followed by turning one's 3 
back on-the life that belongs to the flesh, which is on a lower I 
- plane. It is a simple step to associate all that is evil in life with 
the material or bodily side and all .that is noble with the . 
spiritual-as if there were not as much and more spiritual evil ' . , 
than bodily,! There follows the doctrine of original sin or the I 
innate corruption of human nature, the seat.of that corruption 
being the flesh. What Plato left undone in riveting this heresy 
upon men's minds St. Paul and st: Augustine completed. The 
result today is that social evil is attributed not to error, or his- 
torical ca&s, not to economic or class interests but to the 
ineradicable and inscrutable evil in human nature. This pro- , 
vides a welcome alibi for the real interests opposing reform, ' 
spreads a pessimism and defeatism equally useful in preserv- - 
ing the status quo and directs the whole of human effort to - 
the task of purifying the soul-by breaking its links with the 
world and its temptations, in other words to the task of lifting 
- oneself by one's own boot-straps. 
Much has been written recently to disparage that social effort 
which assumes that man cad behave decently. Social reform- 
ers, we are told, neglect man's inherent wickedness, attempt 
ing "to explain his being and purpose on one plane." Tht  
dualistic or religious view i s  that man has being on two planes, 
the material and the spiritual, and therefore needs redemp- 
23 tion. 
' . "Society," says Aldous Huxley,"can never be greatly impro;ed 
until sdch time as most of its members choose to become theo- 
ceqtric saints." If our fathers had argued in this way few great 
reforms would have been achieved. Today it is "calculated to 
spread alarm and despondency in the k i ~ d s  of men and 
women of goodwill who will otherwise give their practical aid 
and support to progrehsive social policies ." 24 
This literary pessimism which i s  widespread both in criti- 
cism and in credve work is a true reflection of the conditions 
which. have shaped them. It is, philosophically, clearly related 
to'irrationalism and subjectivism on the one hand, and to a 
decadent modern theology on the other. A typical example is 
the late Bernard Lord Manning, a modern Calvinist, starkly 
opposed'to Modernism. His deepest dissent was from "the be- 
lie£ that man and his world are &d, that given a chance they, 
will develop alright." What he stood for was "renunciation, not 
amelioration, ,of-the world; transformation, not development, 
of the individual." , 
The optimistic literature of the early Shaw and Wells, based 
on the belief that man was essentially a rational and decent 
creature, has suffered, shipwreck. Man will listen neither to 
sermons nor to reason. His nature is'not fundamentally good 
but evil, as the psycho-analysts have shown. The reaction be- 
gins with Hardy and Housman who viewed man as the sport 
of Nature in some sense malignant: 
And how am I to face the odds 
Of man's bedevilment and God?? 
Lawrence found the human soul diseased, and his cure was 
for trlan to become possessed not by a divine but by an in- 
human will, or, as he put it, "to be inhumanly, physiologically, 
materially, not to feel. according to the human conception." 
- Social collapse and frustration, the war and the appalling moral 
dehac of the Axis peoples reveal man a an mpc tect and , 
sinful creature. Three writers - w b  take the lid off humanity 
are mentioned by Nicfiolson. They are ~ b ~ c ( ;  with his Catho- 
lic background, Kafka who wrote fantastic allegories or night- 
,mares on the impotence of man, and T. S. Eliot. In all of 
them is a Catholic. sense of sin, self-disparagement, defeatism, 
loneliness, cynicism and pedantry. As Connolly says of Joyce, 
' 
"tortured with the lapsed Catholic's .guilt," we find .in him , 
"horror and delight in failpre." He has turned away from social 
responsibilities, "I am afraid I am more interested, Mr. Con- ' 
nolly, in Dublin street names thah in the riddle of the Uni- 
verse." I 
t 
No one would question Joyce's influence .on, literature, his 
eitremely sensitive auditory imagination, his enrichment of - ,  
language. His realism, too, pays the tribute of all devotees of 
pure experience (from Mach to Bergson) to the unique value 
and validity of each separate moment of consciousness. His 
sense of the interpenetration of all moments of reality is not 
only experiential and poetic but reflects Whitehead's view of 
reality as process in which an infinite number of factors and 
relations determine each fleeting event and "the world which 
-we see about us is involved in some more intimate fashion 
than is ordinarily supposed with the things that go oa.in our 
minds." 
Nevertheless, as Edmund Wilson 25 shows, this whole liter- 
ary tendency reflects a desire to stand apart from the common . 
life and live only in the imagination-hot for the fruit of ex- 
perience, but for experience +itself. Reflecting the decadence 
of their class, such writers are "the last historians of .Heart-, 
break House." Hence the "ineffectual fragmentary imagina- 
t i~n ,  the impotence and resignation of Eliot." 26 ,. 
This is the way- the world ends 
Not with a bang but a whimper. 
+ 
There falls on literature a sullenness, a lethargy, a sense of - 
energies ingrown and festering, while poetry is dully weikhted , 
by a leaden acquiescence in defeat. Eventually, as Wilson 
says, "literature, music and pdinting become the three branches 
of neurology!' (Eliot, defending classicism, Royalism ' and 
', , 8 I . 8 -  ' I 
- .' & . ~ D & G ~ ~ X I ~  ~ a ~ $ , - ~ ~ : ~ e  fighi. ratha tb: .keep s&ething akve ., ' .  
zhan in  expecmdm that aaydaing will triumph:') , 
' 
The social critiiis* of. such writers -"dops not aim at,  any- : . ' 
thing: it is an exercise ,of the pure intelligence not driven by 
the motor power of .any hope .and not directed by any creative .- 
imaginidon for the possibilities~~£ human 'life. If they ever ' 
idea te  a preference for any social order differat £ram the . 
prc$eLt one, it is invariably for some society of the past." 
Yet their achievement is considqable; They were coriqct' -in 
,. .. . refuting the shallow optimism that foreww &an rightijng thc 
\ 4 universe by sheer power of will and-reason, man out of relation 
to his claks or condition, man, taking no heed of deve1oPh@ 
6 > 
&a1 *for& and declining institutions. They were right4 in 
' .depicting society as disintegrating and corrupt. ' They were 
, right again in their disruption of mere miterialism aid nat- 
urgism, in welding body and mind in indissoluble unity. 
- 
, They were wrong in isolating .man -as a mere point-intiant ' 
d + * of 'experience, in forgetting the fact that man. without fellow- 
.: s*, ,. without membership in society, is. qdthfng. "Forsooth 
' 
brothers, fellowship is heaven; and lack of fellowship is hell;' 
feI10wship is life, and lack. of feuow~hip~ is death; and the 
. deeds,&at ye do upon. the earth, it is for fellowship's sake that 
ye & dothem, and&! life that is in it, that 'live on and on for 
: :ever, ahdl each one of you pan of it, while many a'man's life ; 
' xipn the ear& from the earth shall wane." - . . 
I !  
I .  Modern Magic 
One of the inevitable results of draining everything but the 
physical and chemical out of matter ahgl so reducing it to pure 
mechanism is that it becomes quite impossible to accouG on 
rational grounds for the objective phenomena sf life and mind 
ahd for the evolution of the living out of the non-living. The 
attempt to explain these away by reducing them to physical 
terms is so hd~elesslv artificial that it immediatelv breaks 
down. Now since ' ex kypmhesi the only material factors &e 
mechanical and the only scientifically rational effects are cal- 
culable and predictable resultants, how do you accouqt for life, 
and how do-you explain the evolution of totally new and un- 
predictable types, such as the bird evolving out of a reptile? 
There can be only one solution-a vital force must be at work. 
But it is the whole aim'of the scientist to reduce such new ef- 
fects fo law, to analyze until he has all the conditions and fac- 
tors responsible for them. To invoke a vital force is to sabotage 
investigation and scientists have been severe on the vitalists in 
consequence. Biologists have strongly opposed the attribution 
of evolution to this non-material mystical urge, this impart-of 
pure spirit on pure matter. They have sought and, to a con- 
siderable and steadily increasing degree, found scientific causes 
for evolutionary change, Where gaps in the causal chain are 
still unbridlpd -the scientist does not  immediately. postulate the 
necessity for miracle but simply continues his investigation in 
the faith that discoverable causes are there. He points cut that 
it is precisely this attitude, in contradiction to baffled surrender 
to vitalism, that has in the past solved innumerable similar 
problems which would never have been solved if a supernatural 
cause had been assumed. 
Vitalism, however, arises from a mistake as to the real mean- 
ing of cause and effect. When Eddington declares that "no 
physiciit today believes in scientific -determinismw he expresses - - 
the common irrationalist view that law is qnly a statement of 
high probability baed on statistical averages and not, therefore, 
a Gatement of. necessity. If this is the cask, then three important 
results ,follow. Firstly, the door is. opened to the operation of 
purely spiritual factors, thus vindicating the reality and inde- 
pendence of the non-material world. Secondly, an indefinite 
&here is indicated outside the bounds of scientific understand- 
ing and control, within which will be included hunian con- 
duct, society, politics and economics. 'Thirdly, science itself 
suffers. ~ a w  has always been regarded by sciedsts as a higher 
level of physical reality which explains the world as we find it 
in experience. This new doctrine rejects that notion and asserts 
that there are nothing but experiences or facts and that "laws" 
merely summarize them for our convenience. - 
The older scientific view was based on the theory that the 
only kind of law or causal necessity was a'mathematical orf 
logical one in which reasoa by itself can deduce the effect 
from the kause or find the effect to be already in the cause, in 
which case, of course, nothhg realiy new can ever happen. 
.In so far -as vitalism shows this view to be inadequate, it 
renders a valuable service. If everything that has happened 
' was contained in the original physical order, "We ought then to 
iekard the present state of the universe as the effect of its ante- . 
cedent state and the cause of the. state that is to follow," says 
Laplace in the classical statement of this position. Now this is 
indeed the case in a great deal of mathematics and physics, a 
simple example being the propositions of Euclid. But events 
occur which are certainly not predictable in this way, for ex- 
ample, the color and other properties of chemical compounds, 
the behavior of protoplasm, and so ,on. These effects are not 
mathema'tical resultants. 'Are they therefore irrational? Are 
they outside scientific causation? Are they merely inexplicable, 
observed succession-given A then B always follows? only if 
we accept a purely logical notion of reason and causation: 
~ u t  is this the real meaning of causation? Not at all. The 
more modern theory of causation finds it not in mathematical 
determinism lwt in all the conditions, internal and external, 
which give rke to the effect, This effect is not antecedently 
predictable, but after it has once been analyzed completely into 
its conditions it is not merely probable, on statistical grounds, 
but certain, necessary. Such an effect is, of course, something 
quite new. It is not a resultant of the factors comprising the 
cause. It is not on the level of the assembled conditions; it is . C 
the effect of their complete synthesis into a new whole, reireal- 
ing new qualities and properties. Cause &us becomes not a 
matter of resultants but of emergence of the new, of genuine 
creative evolution. Life itself is the best, though the most diffi- 
cult, .example; The antecedent conditions do not contain life, 
yet in the living organism there is nothing in the way of con- 
stituents but those which were originally non-living. The only 
difference is the assembly and arrangkment or organization 
of all these non-living -.constituents. Such an organizatibn is 
a living organism. 1ts cause simply is all the factors and con- 
ditions. If there are no more factors to discover, there is no 
additional cause to discern. 
The vitalist who holds that an &Beet cannot differ from its 
cause but must be contained ia it, and that the non-living can- 
\ 
uvmg, is' himself simply a mechanistic ma-. 
inadequate view of .matter and a limited, 
understanding of cause and 'effect. In fact, 
usality by denfing that effect can be funda- 
mentally different from cause. It is his own inadequate view- 
of causation which compels him ,to accept only two possible 
explanation's of the emergence of something new: (a) the new 
must always have k e n  in the antecedent conditions although . 
it was not discernible; thus if life appears at some stage it - 
must always- have be& present': -and. if mind appears later, it, 
too, must always have been, present and therefore is an unseen . 
and undi~overable quality of all physical things; (b) the new 
$ 
must come from outside the material as an invasion or injec- 
tion from another world of life and mind. 
Therefore neither the mkhanist nor the vitalist can explain 
the emergence of the new in rational terms, because their con- 
ception of what 'is rational, of what is "explanation" is inade- , 
quatea- What' needs to be done is to revise the conception, of 
scientific explanation until it is competent to cover crqativity 
in nature. Creativity was not possible on the basis of the 
earlier view of scientific exphation, and yet nature is one 
succession of novelties and is creative though and through. 
Marxism has always held firmly to the thewy of integrative 
levels and qualitative change while denying the need of vitalis- 
tic interference. Mgrxism is wholly at one with modern sci- 
ence, and modern philosophy in this approach, which escapes 
from the dilemma by avoiding the original error of dualism, 
.which denied the capacity for life and change to matter. 
Marxism finds! a sufficient explanation firstly in the, infinite 
potentialities of matter; secondly, in the self-movement of 
matter; thirdly, 'in the repatterning of matter as it seeks ti, 
adjust internal to external 'relations and as it develops its own 
various aspects in organic relation to its environment. This is 
I sufficient to:account for the evolution of all the successive and 
infinitely varied types of existence, 'including Eving forms, 
thinking animals, social types like man, and eventually of 
'society itself. 
* 
Vitalism, however, is not onl i  a scientific but a social heresy. 
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, pro!Aam of societywhich places them ocyond' rational cqn;rd. 
It encourages belief' in the existence of 'unconscious urges and 
: blind irrational forces. 
An age of increasing contradictions and social paradoxes, in 
which poverty and plenty increase together, and want seems 
actually to be created by the same system .that is producing 
wealth to an unexampled degree, in which war and economic 
slump descend on the peoples, like natural calamities, is an 
-* I age in which men will- feel themselves increasingly to be the 
, ' sp r t  of forces they can neither explain nor understand. 
But a vigorous attempt to find a rational solution is bound , I 
to discover economic causes for poverty, unemployment and 
. war which are rooted in the system of class ownership and can 
, only be finally ~emoved by ending it. Since such a solution r 
is unwelcome both to those who profit by the jratus quo and by. 
those who t,hink they might, and since the rest are economically . 
dependent upon the ruling class and derive their ideas largely 
from the education and provided by it, the result 
will be a flat refusal of the mind eves to entertain the possi- 
bility of radical reform. 
It %thus becomes as impossibl= to understand or control so- 
cial phenoqena as it would be electrical phenomena if we 
began by refusing to acknowledge the existence of ele'ctricity. 
There is an obsession here which can only be explained psy- 
' , chologically. The urge to fly from the truth at all costs drives 
.the pind into every kind of fantastic and supernatural explana- 
tion and resort. ,,Hence the popularity of astrology, mysticism 
' and every kind of superstition today. 
, The result of the c6lapse of Europe's spiritual and social 
' 
dr&r, says Drucker, is that mei turn to miracle. The final 
defeat of reason and order was the failure first of capitalism 
and then of orderly liberal reform. There* man is con- 
vinced that the world has nb order and follows no law-the, 
forces which govern society have become irrational, therefore 
, miracle is the only way out and he will believe in nothing' 
I else. % 
"The 'conventional lie' of a society divided 'into classes' as- 
qsumes proportions which are aH the more extensive according 
as the existing order bf things is endangered through econo~ic 
evolution and by the working of the class struggle which is 
the outdme of that evolution. Marx said truly that ehe greater 
the development of antagonisms between the growing-forces 
of production and the extant social order, the more does 
the ideology of the ruling class become permeated with 
hypbcrisy . 99 2s 
Our ancestors invented the supernatural to give them faith 
in a world of perils which they could not control. It was - ,  - r  
both understandable and excusable. Moreover, superstition 5 :  
was mingled with empirical facts of some value. It was not - impossible to progress through partial and inadequate under- 
standing to science and rationalitj.. In our day we sin against 
the light. With all the achievements of science in our hands 
weo turn back to magic. This wilful reaction is &thological 
and its effect mental disintegration, the cult of unreason. \ ' Now ;he rational buttress of irrationalism is that form- of 
' idealism which we call vitalism, is that failure to\ explain 
change which describes it as "statistical regularity" because law 
is no longer believed in. ' 
a Thus does a false ideology support a reactionary social at- 
titude and confuse, paralyze and discourage the activity of 
thought in the solving of economic and political problems., 
. What is already a well-marked sympton of the modern niind 
in the English-speaking world has long been the predominant 
, philosophy of both Italy and the Third Reich. On the-one 
hand an exaggerated idealism reducing the historical world 
to pure, unalterable :Idea" in which the individual holds a fixed 
and completely subordinate place. On +e other, the repudia- 
tion of reason, and a complete surrender to primitive instinct 
as the short cut to reality. The more morbid- forms which 
idealism and irrationalism, particularly in Germany, have 
taken, are too numerous to mention, though of great 
interest. 30 
Otto Spann is simply Hegel without his dialectic and with- 
oht his revolutionary dynamics. Taking the capitalist system 
as i t ' i s  with its false ctitegories of the market, employer and 
employed, over-production, 'supply and demand, financial 
stringency, it regards these as unalterable laws of an unchang- ' 
ing whole, logical necessities in which man is forever trappkd. 
The world is not, as it was for Hegel, a selkhadging, self- 
emancipating whole but a permanent condition of slavery for 
mankind-a st'atic caste system, the corporative state. 
Klages, the apostle of instinct, exalts animalism as funda- 
mental life force which determines the nature of society. Every 
animal devours and expects to be devouted. All social theories 
which assume a different principle for man are beside the 
point. The life force in social life is that tribal spirit which 
completely swamps and embraces all individuals. The indi- 
.vidual surrenders himself and his reason to the tribe and mass 
.feeling. In getting rid of the individual we also get .rid of all 
' those awkward doctrines of the rights of man, justice, equality, 
humanitarianism, and democracy, which stand in the way of 
the privilege and absolute authority of the bosses of the Fascist 
state. - 
# "Fascist thought is. thus in continuous oscillation between 
the two poles of Vitalism and Totalitarianism. Both succeed ' 
' in establishing that which is the main requirement of Fascist 
philosophy-lhe'concept of a human society that would not be 
a relationship of persons." " . 
It is clear that Idealism under the constraining influence of 
'a society in disintegration in which the ruling classes are de- 
termined at all costs to resist social change does not remain 
a mere intellectual error which we might regard with disin- , 
terested tolerance, it becomes a powerful weapon of reaction, 
a mental poison which by reinforcing Fascist 'policies and 
weakening- resistance to them, by inhibiting the mind against 
polrcies of rational and hopeful reconstruction, becomes a pow- 
erful ideological ally of the worst forces of corruption and 
selfdestruction in the modern world. 
And this whole philosophy of reaction in its various phases 
*arises theoretically from an artificial dualism. "Throughout 
the Universe there reigns &e union of opposites which is the 
' 
ground of dualism. Whenever a viciqus dualism appears, it 
is by reason of mistaking an abstraction for a final fact." 32 
4 
The universe is dual because each final actuality known to 
us is both physical and mental. But if we lose the unity in a 
divided universe, then out of the false dualism arises as one 
pole that mentalism or idealism which is the source of our 
modern superstitions and irrationalisms. To bring about 
fundamental causes is that superstition has taken so firm 
effect a restoration of unity. 
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